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INTRODUCTION

A fundamental right of every U.S. citizen under the Fourth Amendment is the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 1 The United States Supreme Court defines an unreasonable search as any search conducted without proper warrant, subject
to a few limited exceptions. a Automobile searches are one of these
narrow exceptions. 3
A warrantless search of an automobile must be based on probable
cause 4 and limited to searches for evidence, searches incident to an
arrest, 5 or inventory searches.6 The Supreme Court defines an automobile inventory search as the "routine practice, of securing and inventorying the automobile contents."7 Although the proper scope of
an automobile inventory search is the question of much debate, in
1987, the Supreme Court held an inventory search reasonable that included police officers opening a closed container found within an automobile.8 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, in
accordance with Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution,9 recently restricted the authority of police officers to open closed containers discovered during an automobile inventory search.
In Autran v. State,10 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found
"[t]he officers [sic] interest in the protection of appellant's property,
as well as the protection of... the agency from claims of theft, can be
satisfied by recording the existence of and describing and/or
photographing the closed or locked container. '"'1 Thus, Autran interpreted Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution as requiring less
intrusive means than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath'or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
3. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
4. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
5. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
6. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976).
7. Id. at 369.

8. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1987).
9. The Texas Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions,
from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any
place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as
near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
10. 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
11. Id. at 42.
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for conducting automobile inventory searches. This note examines
the proper scope of an automobile inventory search as currently defined under federal and Texas law, and discusses Autran's failure to
adhere to stare decisis'2 by unnecessarily overturning previously relied
upon precedents.
II.

HISTORY OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT

*A. The Automobile Exception
Under the Fourth Amendment, automobiles are generally exempt
from the warrant requirement because of an individual's inherent
lesser expectation of privacy in them and their mobility.13 In 1925, in
Carroll v. United States,14 officers stopped an automobile based on
probable cause that the occupants were transporting illicit liquor.15
While conducting a warrantless automobile search, officers discovered
several cases of liquor under the seat upholstery. The Supreme Court
held the warrantless automobile search reasonable because there was
probable cause to believe the automobile was carrying contraband. 16
The Carroll Court reasoned, "[I]t is not practicable to secure a warrant [for an automobile] because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."' 7
Fifty years later, in Cardwell v. Lewis,'i the Supreme Court held the
warrantless examination of an automobile's exterior reasonable.' 9 In
Lewis, the respondent was arrested for murder. 20 An exterior examination of the respondent's automobile revealed incriminating evidence linking the respondent to the crime scene.21 The Lewis Court
stated, "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects., 22 Therefore, by
distinguishing between a warrantless search of an automobile's exterior and an individual's residence, the Lewis Court held that due to an
individual's inherent lesser expectation of privacy in his automobile,
an automobile
is not subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant
23
requirement.
12. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
13. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).
14. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 153.
417 U.S. 583 (1974).
Id at 592.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
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Policies for Upholding WarrantlessAutomobile Inventory
Searches

In 1967, in Cooper v. California,24 the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless automobile search even though there was no threat the automobile would leave the jurisdiction.2 5 In Cooper, officers seized the
petitioner's automobile after arresting him for selling heroin. 26 The
petitioner's conviction was based on evidence seized without a warrant from the automobile's glove compartment one week after the petitioner's arrest.2 7 The Cooper Court upheld the conviction, stating,
"It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the
car in their custody for such a length of time,'had no right, even for
'2 8
their own protection, to search it."
One year later, in Harris v. United States,2 9 protection of property
was the basis for upholding a warrantless automobile search. While
safeguarding the petitioner's automobile from the elements, an officer
discovered in plain view a robbery victim's automobile registration
card.30 The petitioner was convicted of robbery based upon this evidence.3 1 The Supreme Court found the intrusion reasonable because
the automobile was initially impounded "to protect the car [from the
elements] while it was in police custody '3 2 and "objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."3 3
Furthermore, in 1973, in Cady v. Dombrowski,3 4 public safety was
the basis for holding an automobile inventory search reasonable.3 5
24. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
25. Id. at 61-62.
26. Id. at 58-61.
27. Id. at 58.
28. Id. at 61-62 (purpose of the search was to obtain legal title for a forfeiture
proceeding).
29. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
30. Id.

31. Id. at 234-35.
32. Id. at 236. Harris has been relied upon twice to uphold convictions based on
evidence found during automobile inventory searches. In United States v. Mitchell,
458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972), the defendant was stopped and arrested for speeding.
An officer noticed an open case containing watches in the defendant's automobile.
While safely securing the watches, the officer found a gun in the case. Mitchell was
subsequently convicted for the unlawful possession of a weapon. The court of appeals
upheld the conviction and stated "the action of the patrolman in safeguarding valuable property in plain sight in a lawfully impounded car was reasonable . . . ." Id. at
961. In United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972), the defendant was
arrested on outstanding traffic warrants. Officers found counterfeit bills while conducting an automobile inventory search. In justifying the inventory search, the court
of appeals found such inventories serve the purposes of "protecting the defendant's
property and safeguarding the police from groundless claims for 'lost' possessions."

Id. at 178.
33. Harris,390 U.S. at 236.
34. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
35. Id. at 447.
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The defendant in Cady was involved in an automobile accident.36 Officers, concerned that the defendant police officer might have left his
service revolver in his automobile, searched the automobile and discovered evidence linking the defendant to a murder.37 The defendant
was later convicted of murder based upon the seized evidence.38 The
Supreme Court held the search reasonable based on "concern for the
safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder
removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle." 39
In South Dakota v. Opperman,4 ° the Supreme Court reversed a
lower court decision and held the police did not violate the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights when officers conducted an inventory search of the respondent's automobile.41 In Opperman, the
respondent's automobile was towed for violating a parking ordinance. 42 Pursuant to standard police department procedures, officers
conducted an inventory search and found a bag of marijuana in the
unlocked glove compartment of the respondent's automobile. 43 The
Opperman Court held automobile inventory searches are reasonable
if conducted for "the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, the protection of police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the police
from potential danger."
The Opperman Court relied on the policies announced in Cooper,
Harris, and Cady.45 However, Opperman did not directly address the
question of whether the proper scope of such inventory searches includes closed containers seized from within an automobile. 46 Rather,
the Opperman Court stated, "[w]hen the police take custody of any
sort of container [such as] an automobile ... it is reasonable to search
47

the container to itemize the property to be held by the police.
Texas courts later followed Opperman and extended the scope of an
automobile inventory search to include closed containers found
therein.48
In summary, the United States Supreme Court distinguishes between automobiles and dwellings because of an individual's inherent
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 447.
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
Id. at 365.

42. Id. at 365-66.
43. Id. at 366.
44. Id. at 369 (footnotes omitted).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 371.
47. Id. (quoting United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1973)).
48. See, e.g., Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Heitman v.
State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
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lesser expectation of privacy in his automobile and its mobility.49
Thus, warrantless automobile searches are generally upheld if conducted to protect the police from danger,5s to protect an owner's
property,5 ' to protect police from
claims of lost or stolen property, 2
53
or to protect the general public.
C. Extending Automobile Inventory Searches to Closed Containers
Found Therein
In Colorado v. Bertine,54 the scope of a vehicle inventory search was
extended to include searching personal belongings left in a van. 5 In
Bertine, the respondent was arrested for driving while under the influence.5 6 During an inventory search of the respondent's van, an officer
discovered a closed backpack. 7 The officer opened the backpack and
found three metal canisters containing an assortment of illegal drugs,
and a large quantity of cash.58
The lower court found the inventory search unreasonable because
the petitioner's automobile was stopped in a place sufficient to protect
the petitioner's property, and the petitioner was not "offered an opportunity to make other arrangements to safeguard his property." 59
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and found "[t]he reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or
invariably turn on the existence of alternative less intrusive means."6
The Bertine Court found that the lower court erroneously relied
upon Arkansas v. Sanders61 and United States v. Chadwick,62 because
these cases concerned investigation of criminal conduct requiring
probable cause, rather than inventory searches. 63 The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision and held the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.'
49. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
50. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967).
51. United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
53. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
54. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
55. Id. at 368-69.
56. Id. at 368.
57. Id. at 369.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 373.
60. Id. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)).
61. 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1979) (holding officers with probable cause cannot
search a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi because securing luggage in an automobile's trunk does not diminish the owner's expectancy of privacy in such items).
62. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding officers with probable cause cannot seize and open
a container found within an automobile without a search warrant).
63. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371.
64. Id. at 376.
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The Bertine Court based its decision on the policies announced in
Opperman and Illinois v. Lafayette.65 In Lafayette, an inventory
search of the defendant's shoulder bag during the booking process revealed incriminating evidence.66 The Lafayette Court found reasonable the police department's procedures for opening closed containers
and listing their contents.67 Thus, by relying on Lafayette, the Bertine
Court found "reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.... ,68
Recently, in Florida v. Wells, 69 the Supreme Court reinforced the
importance of standardized police procedures. In Wells, officers discovered marijuana while conducting an inventory search of a suitcase
found in an impounded automobile.7 ° The Florida Supreme Court
held the inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment because
the police had no standardized procedures for opening closed containers.71 The Wells Court affirmed the decision and found police departments must have established routines for opening closed containers
found during inventory searches because "an inventory search must
not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."72
III.

AUTOMOBILE INVENTORY SEARCHES IN TEXAS

A. Texas Adopts South Dakota v. Opperman
Prior to Autran, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals harmonized
Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 73 Moreover, in 1976, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the Opperman holding as it relates to automobile inventory searches.
In Robertson v. State,74 the appellant wrecked his automobile and
was sent to the hospital. 7 During an inventory search of the appellant's automobile, officers found marijuana in the glove compartment.76 Relying on Opperman, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
65. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
.66. Id. at 641-42.

67. Id. at 648.
68. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374.
69. 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en
banc); Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Bower v State, 769
S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989); Eisenhauer v.
State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983); Crowell v. State, 180 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
74. 541 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
75. Id. at 609.
76. Id.
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held the inventory search reasonable because "it was incident to the
caretaking function of the police to protect the community's safety.""
Two years later, in Evers v. State,7 8 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again relied on Opperman. In Evers, the appellant was arrested
for an "improper start from a parked position."' 79 During an inventory search of the appellant's impounded automobile, an officer
opened an unlocked attache case, revealing a handgun.80 The Evers
Court held the inventory search reasonable as a legitimate caretaking
function. 8 '
B. Texas Requires the Automobile's Lawful Impoundment
In Daniels v. State,82 the appellant was stopped for traveling the
wrong way on a one-way street. 83 The appellant and his two passengers were arrested,' and the appellant's automobile was impounded
for safekeeping. While conducting an inventory search, officers found
and seized three weapons.85
The appellant argued his companions were arrested only as a subterfuge to justify the impoundment of his automobile in order for police to conduct the inventory search.86 The Daniels court rejected this
argument and held the impoundment and search lawful because the
appellant was legally arrested, and the police would have been derelict
in their duties if they had allowed the automobile to be left with any
of its passengers, none of whom had a valid driver's license. 87 Thus,
under Daniels, an inventory search of an automobile will be upheld if
there was a lawful impoundment of the automobile.88
In Benavides v. State,89 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found
an impoundment improper, and thus held the inventory search illegal
under the Fourth Amendment.9" In Benavides, an officer found the
appellant with a self-inflicted wound lying alongside his dead wife in
the appellant's garage. 91 Officers located the appellant's automobile
legally parked two blocks away on a residential street.92 An inventory
search produced a suicide note which was later used to convict the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 611.
576 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 50 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman 428 U.S. 364 (1976)).
600 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 814-15.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
600 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
Id. at 812.
Id. at 810.
Id.
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appellant of murder.93 The Benavides court held, "[T]he mere arrest
of a defendant cannot be construed to authorize seizure of his automobile."'9 4 Furthermore, "There must
be some reasonable connection
'95
between the arrest and the vehicle.
C. Automobile Inventory Searches Include Compartments or
ContainersFound Therein
In Gill v. State,96 officers discovered the appellant sitting in his automobile holding a syringe. The appellant was arrested for possession of
hydromorphone. 97 During the automobile search, officers removed
the back seat in order to gain access to the locked trunk.98 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held the search violated Article I, Section
9 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth Amendment because no
probable cause existed to believe the trunk contained contraband. 99
The Gill court reasoned, "There is a greater expectancy of privacy in
the trunk than in the interior because it is not in plain view and is not
normally involved in government control and inspection.' ' 100 The
court denied the state's motion for rehearing on the issue of whether
the search could be sustained as an inventory. 1 1 The Gill court
found even though officers have the right to impound and perform
caretaking functions, they do not have the right to use force0 2to enter a
locked trunk under either the Texas or U.S. Constitution.
In Stephen v. State,10 3 however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held officers can lawfully enter and inventory search the contents of an automobile trunk if they have the keys to the trunk. In
Stephen, officers stopped the appellant after observing him make an
abrupt left turn without a signal.' 04 Officers arrested the appellant
0 5
after verifying outstanding felony warrants in the appellant's name.'
During an automobile inventory search, officers took the keys from
the ignition, opened the trunk, and found incriminating evidence in a
paper bag.' 0 6 The appellant claimed the evidence was inadmissible
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. 625 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
97. Id. Hydromorphone hydrochloride is a synthetic derivative of morphine with

an analgesic potency of approximately ten times that of morphine.

STEDMAN'S MEDI-

DICTIONARY 733 (25th ed. 1990).
98. Gill, 625 S.W.2d at 310.

CAL

99. Id. at 311-12.
100. Id. at 311.
101. Id. at 320.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
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because the paper bag was a repository for personal effects, and thus
the appellant had an inherent expectation of privacy in it.' °7
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellant's conviction and held permissible inventory searches of such container
items as long as police departments have policies permitting such procedures.10 8 The Stephen court found even though it is possible to protect the container's contents by sealing the container, it is also
reasonable to inventory an unsealed container and its contents. 0 9
"[L]ess intrusive alternatives" are not required."'
D. Texas Is Not Bound by United States Supreme Court Decisions
In Heitman v. State,"' an appellant sought to overturn his conviction for possession with intent to deliver by claiming an automobile
inventory search, which produced methamphetamine from a locked
briefcase, violated the appellant's rights under both the federal and
Texas Constitutions." 2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted
the appellant's petition for discretionary review for the purpose of determining whether Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution accords the citizens of Texas greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment. 3 The Heitman court expressly stated that when analyzing and interpreting Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, it
will not be bound by Supreme4 Court decisions addressing comparable
Fourth Amendment issues."
Without deciding the merits, the Heitman court remanded the case
to determine whether the inventory search violated Article I, Section
9, but failed to issue instructions or guidelines to interpret Article I,
Section 9 independent of the Fourth Amendment. On remand, the
lower court followed precedent, affirmed the appellant's conviction,
reasonable under Article I, Section 9 of the Texas
and held the search
5
Constitution."
Under a federalist system, states are free to reject federal rulings as
long as such rulings do not fall below the minimal constitutional standards set by the United States Supreme Court." 6 Though the Heitman court recognized this legal principle, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals never affirmatively stated whether Article I, Section 9 of the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)).
Id.
815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 690.
See Heitman v. State, 836 S.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992,

no pet.).

116. See also Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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Texas Constitution actually grants greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment." 7 Was the Heitman court stating a truism regarding
federalism? Or does Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution in
certain circumstances grant greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment? The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals answered this
question in Autran v. State." 8
IV. A
A.

UTRAN V. STATE

Statement of the Facts

In Autran, an Orange County sheriff stopped the appellant and his
son for failing to drive within a single lane.119 The appellant consented to the search of the automobile's trunk. 2 ° Inside the trunk,
the sheriff discovered a large ice chest, shopping bag, cardboard box,
and two suitcases. 121 However, when the sheriff attempted to open
the ice chest, the appellant immediately closed the trunk. The appellane. 122 The aplant was arrested for failure to drive within a single
23
pellant's son was arrested for public intoxication.'
Officers conducted an automobile inventory search pursuant to established departmental policies. 124 During the search, officers found
large sums of money covered with a white powdery substance. 25 At
that time, officers discontinued the search and the appellant's vehicle
was towed to the sheriff's department where the inventory search resumed in a secured location.126 The seized money was sent to a crime
lab, and the white powdery substance was later determined to be cocaine. 2 During a final inventory search, officers found cocaine in a
closed plastic key box located underneath the driver's seat. 128 The
of a controlled substance and
appellant was convicted for possession
129
prison.
in
years
twenty
to
sentenced
117. See Mathew W. Paul & Jeffrey L. Van Horn, Heitman v. State: The Question
Left Unanswered, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1992).
118. 830 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992), rev'd, 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994).
119. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 33.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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B. Beaumont Court of Appeals
On April 9, 1990, the appellant filed a written notice of appeal with
the Beaumont Court of Appeals.13 ° The appellant advanced two
points of error. The appellant alleged first that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and second, that
3 the appellant's pretrial motion to suppress was unlawfully denied.' 1
The Beaumont Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to link
the cocaine to the appellant. 32 As to the suppression issue, the appellant relied on Gill to argue the items seized "were outside of the parameter of the inventory search."'1 33 However, the Beaumont Court
of Appeals distinguished Gill, and held Opperman and Bertine
controlled. 34
Relying on Bertine, the Beaumont court held the seizure of money
valid based on the sheriff's department's established policies for conducting automobile inventory searches that included containers found
therein. 35 Furthermore, the court found the purpose of the inventory
search was 36to safeguard personal property, a policy valid under
Opperman.1
The appellant argued the key box evidence should be suppressed,
claiming the purpose of an automobile inventory search is to take
stock of "loose personal items" found within an automobile. 137 Thus,
since the key box was attached underneath the seat, the appellant argued it was not subject to the inventory search. The Beaumont court
rejected this argument, reasoning the 38
key box may have contained valuable jewels requiring safeguarding.
The Beaumont court, as required by Heitman, determined the validity of the inventory search under the Texas Constitution and not the
Fourth Amendment. 139 The court harmonized Article I, Section 9 of
130. Autran v. State, 830 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992), rev'd, 887
S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 811 (holding the state must show appellant exercised control over the
contraband and knew the items were contraband to prove unlawful possession) (citing
Guiton v. State, 742 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)). The court considered such factors as whether the accused had access to the contraband, whether the
accused was the driver of the automobile in which the contraband was found, whether
the contraband was found underneath the accused's seat, and whether the accused
owned the automobile in which the contraband was found. Id.
133. Id. at 812.
134. Id. at 812-13. The court distinguished Autran from Gill. In Gill, officers
gained access through forced entry, and in Autran the appellant consented to the
opening of his trunk. See Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
135. Autran, 830 S.W.2d at 812.
136. Id. at 813.
137. Id. at 814.
138. Id. at 815.
139. Id. at 813 (citing Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991)).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol2/iss2/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V2.I2.6

12

Williams: Stare Decisis and Autran v. State

19951

AUTRAN v. STATE

with the Fourth Amendment
the Texas Constitution
14 1
the conviction.

4°

and affirmed

C. The Texas Court of CriminalAppeals
1. Autran Applies the Fourth Amendment
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Texas Constitution grants greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the
context of inventory searches. 42 The Autran court first summarized
the relevant federal case law. 14 3 In applying the facts to federal law,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the inventory search lawful under the Fourth Amendment.'"
2. Autran Relies on Heitman
After determining the inventory search valid under the Fourth
the Autran court embarked upon a discussion of federalAmendment,
ism. 45 The court noted the United States Constitution provides the
floor for an individual's rights, whereas the Texas Constitution sets the
ceiling for those rights." 4 In Heitman, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held the Texas Constitution may in some circumstances afford greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 47 Thus, the
Autran court applied Heitman's reasoning to determine whether Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution provides greater protection
140. Id. (citing Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) and Brown
v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
141. Autran, 830 S.W.2d at 816.
142. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 33.
143. Id. at 34-36. Judge Baird noted the Supreme Court has long held automobile
inventory searches an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). Inventory searches
are reasonable if they are conducted to protect an owner's property, protect police
against claims of lost or stolen property, or protect the police from danger. See, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The Fourth Amendment only requires an automobile inventory search not be a subterfuge to search for incriminating
evidence without probable cause. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990). The
Supreme Court also requires standardized police procedures for conducting inventory
searches. See, e.g., Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648. Moreover, officers are not required to
employ less intrusive means. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373-74
(1987). Therefore, an officer may at his discretion decide to open a closed container
found within an automobile. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
144. Autran, 830 S.W.2d at 35-36. The court considered determinative the officer's
testimony that the search was conducted according to department policy which included the opening of closed containers, and that there was no showing the inventory
search was a ruse to discover evidence.
145. Id. at 36.
146. Id.
147. Id
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than the 48Fourth Amendment in the limited context of inventory
searches. 1
3.

Autran Applies the Texas Constitution

The Autran court used the following factors in its independent analysis of the Texas Constitution: 1) an examination of the text; 2) the
framers' intent and the historical consideration and application of the
Texas Constitution; 13)49 comparable jurisprudence; and 4) practical
policy considerations.
a. Examination of the Text
By comparing the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, the
Heitman court found there was a strong resemblance in form and
choice of words between the two constitutional provisions. However,
the Autran court concluded the language used in both constitutional
provisions is vague, generic, and required further analysis. The Autran court found little evidence in the text to indicate the framers of
the Texas Constitution intended Article 1, Section 9 to provide greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment.'
b.

The Framer'sIntent and Historical Considerationand
Application of the Texas Constitution

The Autran court stated Article I, Section 9 was the primary protector of an individual's rights against state action until 1949, when the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was extended to the states.151 Therefore, the Autran
court found that the framers of Article I, Section 9 drafted the article
without considering the Fourth Amendment, recognizing the Fourth
Amendment did not extend to the states before 1949.152 Thus, there is
no evidence that the framers of the Texas Constitution looked to the
United States Constitution for guidance. The Autran court found this
indicates Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution provides
broader protection.'5 3
c.

Comparable Jurisprudence

The Autran court noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
held its constitution provides greater protection for criminal defend148. Id.
149. Id. at 37.

150. Id. at 38.
151. Id. at 39.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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ants than the Fourth Amendment. 154 Furthermore, the Autran court
noted many other states have interpreted their state constitutions to
provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.15 5 The Autran court determined California, South Dakota, and Alaska find
greater protection in their constitutions, and specifically
extend
1 56
greater protection to automobile inventory searches.
The court concluded the rationale behind these state court rulings is
that inventory searches should not be a "pretext to discover not readily visible evidence."'15 7 Moreover, the Autran court found state
supreme courts that continue to follow the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment are violating their
sworn duty to preserve, protect and defend their own constitutions. 158
d. Policy Considerations
In reversing the Beaumont Court of Appeals, the Autran court held,
"Article I, Section 9 does provide a privacy interest in closed containers which is not overcome by the general policy considerations underlying an inventory search.""' The Autran court found inventory
searches "can be satisfied by recording the existence of and describing
and/or photographing the closed or locked container. ' 160 Moreover,
the court expressly stated it "refuse[s] to presume the search of a
closed container reasonable under Article I, Section '9 simply because
an officer followed established departmental policy. "161
154. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Mass. 1992) and
Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985)). The. Massachusetts
Constitution provides:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers,, and all his possessions. All
warrants, thereof, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in
the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest
one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
155. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 40 n.9. The court cited constitutions from Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington. Id.
156. Id. at 40-41.

157. Id. at 40 (citing Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1971); People v.
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1975); State ,.Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D.
1975); and State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979)).
158. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 40.

159. Id. at 41-42.
160. Id. at 42.
161. Id.
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The Dissent

In his dissent, Judge McCormick declared "[T]he plurality [is] attempt[ing] to lead this court down a slippery slope of judicial activism
...
162 Judge McCormick believed the plurality was trying to correct an injustice by imposing a "socially and politically desirable result. ' 1 63 He believed historical precedents, contrary to the plurality's
opinion, require the plurality to exercise judicial restraint and not hold
that the inventory search violates Article I, Section 9 of the Texas
Constitution.
Judge McCormick claimed Heitman only stands for the proposition
that Texas has the right to provide greater protection than the United
States Constitution, not that Article I, Section 9 actually grants greater
protection." 6 Judge McCormick stated the plurality should have remanded Autran, as did the majority in Heitman,'65 and allowed the
lower court to determine whether Article I, Section 9 of the Texas
166
Constitution was violated.
Believing Heitman only states a truism, Judge McCormick reasoned
prior case law constitutes valid precedent. Judge McCormick contended Texas case law follows federal Fourth Amendment case law
when interpreting Article I, Section 9.167 Therefore, stare decisis dictates restraint and deference to the legislative process. 16 Moreover,
Judge McCormick stated his approach is not unreasonable
because
169
the citizens of Texas frequently amend their constitution.
Judge McCormick found the automobile inventory search lawful
under Article I, Section 9. He pointed to the text of Article I, Section
9, which expressly permits reasonable searches. 17 Since the Autran
plurality never expressly found the inventory search unreasonable,
Judge McCormick assumed the search reasonable. Judge McCormick
claimed the plurality was announcing a better policy for conducting
inventory searches rather than determining whether the inventory in
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 43 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43. In Heitman, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case

to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. The Fort Worth court determined that conducting an inventory of a locked briefcase is reasonable under Article I, § 9. See
Heitman v. State, 836 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
166. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43.

167. Id. at 44-45. As an illustration, Judge McCormick referred to Cagle v. State,
180 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944). The Cagle court relied on Supreme Court

decisions when interpreting the Texas version of the exclusionary rule. The court,
without considering whether Article I, Section 9 afforded greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment, stated, "[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court... should be first
consulted; and, where applicableand controlling, they should be followed." Id. at 937
(emphasis added).
168. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 45.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 46.
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question was reasonable.171 Judge McCormick reasoned this is imintrusive means
proper because Texas law does not require the least
1 72
search.
inventory
automobile
an
conducting
when
Judge McCormick noted, "[T]he plurality apparently concedes that
both constitutional provisions embody the same basic protection. 173
should be interpreted as guaranteeing the
Therefore, both provisions
1 74
same basic protection.
Moreover, Judge McCormick contended much of the comparable
jurisprudence on which the plurality relied does not support their
analysis. He pointed to the plurality's reliance on Mozzetti v. Superior
Court,1 75 which was decided on Fourth Amendment grounds, rather
than independent state grounds, and is therefore irrelevant.1 76 Judge
McCormick concluded, "[Tjhis Court's voice [is] one of power, not
reason."' 177 He stated, "The plurality opinion applies no objective cria result it
teria, and ignores relevant historical precedents in reaching
178
deems socially desirable for the 'unenlightened masses.""
V.

ANALYSIS

Autran attempts to maintain certainty and predictability in the area
of automobile inventory searches by providing a bright line rule.
However, Autran violates the doctrine of stare decisis, the very purpose of which is to create certainty and predictability in the application of law. Despite Heitman, Texas courts have historically
interpreted Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution in harmony
with the Fourth Amendment. The Autran court should not have vioof stare decisis by departing from well-settled
lated the doctrine
79
precedents.1
A.

Autran Avoided Uncertainty by Adopting a Bright Line Rule

Commentators contend Heitman's departure from well-established
constitutional precedent may lead to "uncertainty and ambiguity [for]
police officers, lawyers and judges."' i s However, Heitman only sig171. See id.
172. Id. (McCormick, J., dissenting) (citing Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 43-45.
175. 484 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1971).

176. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 47.
177. Id. at 49.
178. Id.

179. See Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim App. 1976); Robertson v. State,
541 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Daniels v. State, 600 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980);
625 S.W.2d
Crim. App.
180. Paul

Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Gill v. State,
307, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.
1984).
& Van Horn, supra note 117, at 970-71.
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naled a partial departure from precedent. The full departure came
with Autran. Although Autran relied heavily on Heitman, it avoided
uncertainty and predictability by replacing the old bright line rule
from Heitman with a new bright line rule.
Matthew W. Paul and Jeffrey L. Van Horn"' assert Heitman's reasoning for interpreting Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution
independent of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment decisions
was previously tried and rejected with Article I, Section 10 of the
Texas Constitution in Forte v. State.'82 In Forte, the appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and claimed his right to counsel
under Article I, Section 10183 of the Texas Constitution was violated
to consult an attorney prior to adwhen police denied his request
84
ministering a breath test.'
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the appellant's
rights under the Sixth Amendment were not violated. 18 5 The United
States Supreme Court previously held a defendant's rights to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment 186 are triggered "only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant." '87
Thus, the issue in Forte was whether the defendant had a right to
counsel under Article I, Section 10 of the88Texas Constitution prior to
the start of formal judicial proceedings.
In Forte, Judge Duncan relied on United States v. Wade, 89 and
stated "concern will invariably exist at many stages of a criminal prosecution prior to the onset of formal charges; therefore, the demarcation of formal charges before the right to counsel is triggered is
probably arbitrary and capricious."' 190 Thus, Forte rejected the
Supreme Court's bright line rule in favor of a more flexible standard
under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution and required
"each case [to be] judged on whether the pretrial confrontation
presented necessitates counsel's presence so as to protect a known
right or safeguard."' 9 1
181. Id. at 968-71.
182. 759 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc), overruled by McCambridge
v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
183. Article I, Section 10 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
...not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of
" TEX. CONST. art. I § 10.
being heard by himself or counsel, or both ....
184. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 129-30.
185. Id. at 139.
186. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
187. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1994).
188. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 133.
189. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
190. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 134.
191. Id. at 138.
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, overruled Forte in
McCambridge v. State.' 92 In McCambridge, Judge Duncan concluded
the rule requiring a case-by-case determination of what constitutes a
critical stage in the criminal process, thus triggering the right to counsel, is unworkable. 193 The McCambridge court claimed a bright line
rule ultimately benefits the public because such a rule results in predictability, provides precise judicial review, and gives law enforcement
parameters to operate legally. 194
Autran, similar to Forte, departed from Supreme Court precedent.
The Autran court chose not to follow the Supreme Court regarding
inventory searches, just as the Forte court chose not to follow the
Supreme Court on the issue of an individual's right to counsel. Furthermore, Autran, like Forte, abandoned a bright line rule. However,
rather than adopting a more flexible standard, Autran established a
new bright line rule regarding inventory searches. The Autran rule
requires closed containers seized from automobiles during inventory
95
searches to be recorded and/or photographed.1
B. Article I, Section 9 - Textual and Historical Considerations
The Autran court gave little deference to the textual similarity between Article I, Section 9 and the Fourth Amendment. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals claimed the textual similarity was insignificant without considering the framers' intent. Thus, since there is no
information on precisely what protection the framers of Article I, Section 9 intended to afford the citizens of Texas when they drafted the
provision, the Autran court gave little weight to textual similarities
between the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9. However,
the court should not have dismissed the textual similarities so quickly.
There is a plausible theory which supports the fact that the framers
intended for Article I, Section 9 to provide the same protections as the
Fourth Amendment.
Texas had five constitutions from 1836 to 1876.196 The search and
seizure provision remained virtually unchanged in all five versions.' 97
One historian concludes there is no information available on the deliberations of the 1836 Texas Constitution because the drafters were
under great pressure and time constraints. 98 Therefore, the 1836
drafters adopted terms and expressions from older constitutions already interpreted and clarified by the courts. 199
192. 778 S.W.2d 70 (1989).
193. Id. at 75.

194. Id. at 76.

195. Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
196. Paul & Van Horn, supra note 117, at 945-54.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 943 (citing Rupert N. Richardson, Framing the Constitution of the Republic of Texas, 31 Sw. Hist. Q. 191, 214 (1928)).
199. Id.
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In 1876, after Reconstruction, Texas adopted its current constitution
without changing the search and seizure provision of Article I, Section
9.00 During the 1875 constitutional convention, W.N. Ramey of Panola, Texas, said:
Every one here knows very well that the great and leading principles of our American Constitutions are in substance almost the same,

and in none of them are these settled principles better expressed
than in the Constitution of 1845. We certainly don't expect to
change the 20fundamental
principles of Government established by
1
our fathers.
Thus, it is plausible the framers of the Texas Constitution did not debate the search and seizure provision precisely because they were intending to give the citizens of Texas the same protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment.
C. Article I, Section 9

-

Harmonized with the Fourth Amendment

In Crowell v. State,02 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated,
"Art. I, sec. 9, of the Constitution of this State, and the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution are, in all material aspects, the
same."' °3 In Aguilar v. State,2 °4 the appellant argued a violation under
both constitutions.2 0 5 However, the Aguilar court found, "[I]f we
have properly decided this case under our Constitution and statutes
then it has been properly decided under
the Constitution of the U.S.
2 °6
and the holding in Mapp v. Ohio.1
Furthermore, in Hall v. State,2 °7 the appellant argued the insufficiency of an affidavit authorizing the issuance of a search warrant.20 8
Without considering the Fourth Amendment, the Hall court looked to
Aguilar v. Texas209 and held the affidavit was insufficient under Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution. 1 0
For years, Texas courts held officers cannot seize mere evidence as
opposed to implements of crime. 1 When the United States Supreme
Court held the seizure of mere evidence does not violate the Fourth
200. Id. at 954-55.
201. DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 43 (Seth
S. McKay ed., 1930).
202. 180 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
203. Id. at 346; see also Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
204. 362 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962), rev'd and remanded, 378 U.S. 108
(1964).
205. Id. at 113.
206. Id.

207. 394 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).

208. Id. at 659-60.
209. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108 (1964).
210. Hall, 394 S.W.2d at 659.
211. See LaRue v. State, 197 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946); Cagle v.
State, 180 S.W.2d 928, 937-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
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Amendment,2 1 2 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals abandoned its
prohibition on the seizure of mere evidence.2 1 3
Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals followed the
Supreme Court when it broadened the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test
in Illinois v. Gates.214 Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
could have continued to follow the more restrictive Aguilar-Spinelli
215
test, the Texas court instead adopted the broader Gates test.
D. Article I, Section 9 - Granting Lesser Protection than the
Fourth Amendment
In some instances, Texas courts have found Article I, Section 9 to be
more restrictive in scope than the Fourth Amendment.2 16 Texas
adopted an exclusionary rule in 1925, but it was a creature of statute,
rather than a constitutional provision. The Texas exclusionary statute
provides that evidence obtained by an officer in violation of either the
laws or constitutions of Texas and the United States shall not be admitted into evidence against a defendant accused of a crime. 2 17
However, in Welchek v. State,2 1 8 Texas had the opportunity to interpret Article I, Section 9 as providing for an exclusionary rule similar
to that which was later adopted by the Supreme Court in Weeks v.
United States. 219 The Welchek court stated:
[T]here is nothing in [our] constitutional provision inhibiting unreasonable searches and seizures which lays down any rule of evidence
with respect to the evidential use of property seized under search
without warrant, nor do we think anything in said constitutional
provision can be properly construed as laying down such rule ....
We believe that nothing in section 9, art. I, of our constitution...
can be invoked to prevent the use in testimony in a criminal case of
physical facts found on the person or premises of one accused of
212. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
213. Haynes v. State, 475 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
214. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The Aguilar two-prong test is used to
determine whether an informant's information creates probable cause for a search or
arrest. First, the informant must be reliable, and second, there must be facts demonstrating the basis of the informant's knowledge. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-14

(1964). Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), suggests either prong by itself,

supported by evidence, can establish probable cause. Id. at 416-18. Finally, in Gates
the Supreme Court announced a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test. Gates, 462 U.S.
at 230. The Court compared a "totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, which permits a

balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability...
attending and informant's tip" with the "excessively technical dissection of informants' tips" required by the two-prong test. Id. at 234.
215. Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); see also Whaley v. State, 686 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
216. See, e.g., Welchek v. State, 247 S.W. 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922).
217. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); see also
Chapin v. State, 296 S.W.2d 1095, 1099 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927).
218. 247 S.W. 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922).
219. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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crime, which are material to the issue in such case, nor to prevent
oral testimony of the fact of such finding which transgresses no rule
of evidence otherwise pertinent.22°
Similarly, in Stevenson v. State,221 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to adopt the Supreme Court's automatic standing rule
for all persons legitimately on the premises.222 At that time, standing
was a federal procedural question, and thus not binding on the states.
However, in Henley v. State,22 3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

recognized the automatic standing rule, perhaps in light of Mapp v.
Ohio.224
It was not until Rakas v. Illinois225 that standing became a substantive Fourth Amendment question, requiring all states to provide
standing to those having a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
place and items searched. 226 Thus, Welchek and Stevenson indicate
that Article I, Section 9 provides less individual protection than the
Fourth Amendment.
Texas must abide by the minimum procedural standards provided
by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, since the U.S. Constitution
provides the floor for an individual's rights, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is minimally required to read Article I, Section 9 in harmony with the Fourth Amendment.
E. Autran Violates Stare Decisis
Prior to Autran, the law of automobile inventory searches in Texas
was clear. Under Evers v. State,2 27 officers conducting an automobile
inventory search could inventory the contents of closed containers
found therein.228 Once a point of law is settled by a decision of the
state's highest court, it should not be departed from and forms precedent. This is the doctrine of stare decisis.229
Texas courts, however, may depart from "prior rulings where cogent
will suffer less by such a
reasons exist, and where the general interest
230 In State v. Gonzalez, 231
departure, than by a strict adherence.
Judge Baird stated, "When a rule has been once deliberately adopted
220. Welchek, 247 S.W. at 528-29.
221. 334 S.W.2d 814 (1960).
222. See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
223. 387 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965), overruled on other grounds, Ex
parte Wilson, 588 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
224. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
225. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
226. See also Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
227. 576 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
228. Id. at 48-50.
229. 16 TEX. JUR. 3d Courts § 119 (1981).
230. 16 TEX. JUR. 3d § 131 n.2 (citing Higgins v. Bordages, 31 S.W. 52 (Tex. 1895)).
231. 855 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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and declared and uniformly followed, it should not be abandoned ex'
cept upon the most urgent reasons."232
However, in Autran, Judge
Baird did not disclose what the most urgent reasons were for overruling precedent. Instead, he relied upon comparable jurisprudence.
The Autran court might have found guidance from a recent United
States Supreme Court case regarding stare decisis. Although it is only
persuasive authority for the Texas court, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,2 33 Justice O'Connor applied a four-part test to determine

under what circumstances a court should overrule its prior decisions.
Under the Casey test, a court should examine (1) whether the previous rule is workable; (2) whether there has been such reliance on the
previous rule that overruling it would be unjust; (3) whether related
principles of law have so far developed that the old rule is obsolete;
and (4) whether facts have so changed or have become perceived so
differently that the old rule is no longer justified.234
First, in applying the test to Autran, the bright line rule of allowing
law enforcement officers with established procedures to open closed
containers while conducting an inventory search was workable. Second, prior to Autran, the only persons relying on the old law were
police officers. In addition, changing the law does not harm the general public because the new law gives the public protection against
warrantless intrusions. Thus, the public will not be affected because
Autran substitutes one bright line rule for another. Third, related
principles have not changed. As previously stated, an individual has
an inherent lesser expectation of privacy in his automobile than in his
dwelling, and neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has departed from this view. Fourth, policy justifications for automobile inventory searches are still valid.
Such policy reasons include the protection of police officers from
claims of lost or stolen property, the safety of the general public, the
protection of an owner's property, and protection of police officers
from danger.
Stare decisis governs propositions of law and has no application to
fact issues.235 The Autran court did not have to depart from precedent. Instead, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals could have distinguished the facts from its previous decisions and reached the same
result. For example, officers conducted three inventory searches after
seizing Autran's truck.23 6 Inventory searches may not be used as a
pretext to discover evidence which is not easily discoverable. Thus,
232. Id. at 696 (citing Gearheart v. State, 197 S.W. 187, 188-89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1917)).
233. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).

234. Id. at 2808.
235. Rogge v. Gulf Oil Corp., 351 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Duvol County Ranch Co. v. Foster, 318 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ.

App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 33.
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the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals could have held that three successive warrantless inventory searches are unreasonable as a matter of
law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If the Autran court intended to send a warning to police officers not
to use inventory searches as a ruse to discover evidence, then the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should have ruled on that basis. Instead, the Autran court ignored precedent and opted to change the
law by denying officers the right to open closed containers discovered
during inventory searches.
Furthermore, as Welchek demonstrates, if there is any difference between the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution, it is
that the Texas Constitution is more restrictive of an individual's rights.
It is commendable the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals sought to give
independent meaning to the Texas Constitution, but not at the expense of stare decisis. If the laws of Texas require changing, it is a job
more suited for the legislature, not the courts.2 37
Austin Travis Williams

237. Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
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